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Mass media, in their printed or audio-visual forms, increasingly 
permeated everyday life as well as politics in the industrialized 
societies of the twentieth century. Therefore, contemporary historians 
cannot write the history of modern societies without taking these 
media and their impact into account. This article summarizes the 
challenges facing historians of the last century who want to take the 
social and political impact of mass media seriously, and try to gauge 
audience reception. Along the way, it aims to introduce readers to the 
state of the field in both media studies and historiography, paying 
particular attention throughout to the advantages and limitations of 
transnational, global or ‘glocal’ versus national approaches.  
As historians, we have to deal with the fact that radio and television 
has dominated societal and political debates since at least the 1930s. 
Before then, the printed mass press fulfilled a similar function since 
the late nineteenth century. Such modern mass media can be 
understood both as sources and factors of history. They did not only 
mirror historical developments, leaving useful coverage of past events 
and debates in printed, taped, and digitized form to be exploited by 
today’s scholars. Mass media were also agents in their own right, 
impacting on decision-making processes and the evolution of societal 
norms and attitudes. But if scholars seek to assess mass media’s impact 
on historical change, weighing it against other factors, they face 
particular challenges.  
Up to the 1980s at least, most media historians chose to understand 
media as a closed system and thus avoided engaging with broader 
questions. They looked at the history of media technology, media 
institutions or the logic of media genres without linking it to society 
or politics at large. As a result, media history became a niche field 
within contemporary history1. This stood in marked contrast to the 
history of earlier periods. For instance, historians of the eighteenth 
century engaged in productive debates about the role of media in the 
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French Revolution, identifying the reception of new, leading mass 
media such as pamphlets as major drivers of social and political 
change2. Contemporary historians meanwhile did not engage deeply 
with media historiography. When writing about the twentieth 
century, they mainly relied on printed media as sources – besides 
archival materials –, disregarding radio and television broadcasts, not 
least because these were much more difficult to access and cite3 . 
Therefore, most of the older historiography on the post-1945 period 
misrepresents the nature of discourses and debates after 1930, 
screening out precisely those leading media, which dominated the 
mass media ensemble since the 1930s4. 
Recently, this pattern has changed, and a growing number of studies 
now highlights the important role played by broadcast and visual 
media in shaping the modern industrial world. But so far, the 
historical treatment of television’s role has been limited to the 
medialization of the political sphere, and to messages rather than 
recipients 5 . Tentatively, many contemporary historians have also 
begun to factor the impact of audiovisual media into large-scale 
explanations of historical change. But particular challenges remain. 
They include limited access to broadcasts and broadcasting archives, 
and a disconnect between the scholarly fields of media/television 
studies and history.  
II. LEARNING FROM MEDIA STUDIES 
Media scholars and historians ask different questions and, it seems at 
times, speak different languages. German 
Kommunikationswissenschaftler and Anglo-American television 
studies scholars, media scholars, and historians everywhere often take 
little notice of works considered canonical in other fields. Whereas 
historians are typically interested in questions of mass media effect 
and societal reception but are split over the value of ratings and 
opinion polls, TV studies scholars understand television as an 
everyday cultural form that frames social reality in specific ways 
through its genres and narrative strategies. They are less focused on 
reception and doubt the constructivist concept of «society» much 
relied on by historians6. Profound disagreement exists, in particular, 
about attempts to measure the responses of mass audiences and the 
social impact of mass media.  
The field of media and television studies has seen decades-long, 
contentious debates about mass media’s impact on audiences. Early 
research followed a behavioristic «hypodermic needle» model, in 
which TV injects messages into the viewer with direct effects. This 
was quickly rejected, but until the mid-1970s, most media scholars 
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still conceived of audiences as rather passive and at least partially 
receptive to media messages. They insisted that viewers’ reactions 
were measurable and followed certain conventions. Many researchers 
were then working with Paul Lazarsfeld’s «two-step flow model of 
communication» (stressing the role of intermediary opinion leaders) 
or the «uses and gratifications» approach, which asked how viewers 
used media to satisfy needs and generate pleasure. From the late 1970s 
onwards, following Stuart Hall’s emphasis on the independence and 
creativity of viewers in «decoding» the «codes» offered to them in 
programming, most scholarship shifted to assume a principal 
asymmetry between intended and actual readings. The idea of 
different types of readings – hegemonic, negotiated and oppositional 
– of one and the same program now came to dominate the profession, 
followed by John Fiske’s notion of «active audiences» that create a 
myriad of individual readings to agree with their specific social 
situation7. By now, a large part of the field had tired of the debate 
about media impact, and the belief in the findings of quantitative 
social research – surveys with representative samples, generalizing 
questions and presumed objectivity – had waned. Instead, emphasis 
was placed on the unpredictability of individual readings, the 
multiplicity of audiences and viewing as an active, not passive process. 
Most scholars interested in past programs were by now wary of 
wading into the methodological quagmire of «media effects»8. They 
typically decided to retreat into safer academic havens, researching 
texts, aesthetics, genres, and production rather than reception. Those 
who insisted on capturing audience reaction began to develop 
ethnographic and refined sociological methods for the analysis of 
1980s and 1990s mass media9 . The focus was less on predictable 
majority responses in mass audiences and more on participant 
observation, with surprising reactions and creative readings by 
individuals commanding particular attention 10 . How individual 
viewers derived emotional pleasures and negotiated identities while 
watching took center stage, whereas television’s impact on «the 
masses» and society faded into the background. This shift in 
scholarship corresponded chronologically to television being 
dethroned as the leading medium, bringing with it a fragmentation 
and dispersal of audiences11. 
Current audience research in media studies investigates talk shows 
and particularly reality formats in which viewers participate by 
commenting or voting on the performances of ordinary people (such 
as Big Brother, Survivor, Wife Swap, or Supernanny). Media scholars 
monitor audience response with interviews, focus groups, and the 
taping of viewers as they talk back to the screen or show affects with 
gasps and sighs12 . This work leads back to assuming some direct 
impact not only on individual viewers but also on society, as it relates 
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television’s messages to the construction of class identities, neoliberal 
values, and gender roles13. Notably, these studies draw on qualitative 
interviews and observation of small groups of less than forty viewers, 
leaving quantitative surveys or ratings aside. And of course they 
neglect past programs, as their methodology cannot be extended to 
the era of early and limited choice television. Television studies 
scholar Lynn Spigel cautions: «The reconstruction of viewing 
experiences at some point in the past is an elusive project»14. Indeed, 
studies looking at mass media of the late 1960s and the 1970s largely 
avoid investigating audience reactions. They treat television, for 
instance, foremost as a mirror, calling it a «barometer of changing 
social mores» and «a showcase of ideological breakdown and 
reconfiguration»15. 
Those historians closest to the field of media and television studies 
lament that the training of future historians does not engage with the 
core terminology and methods of those fields. Michael Meyen, 
historian and communications scholar, demands that historians 
engage more directly with statistical data on audiences and the body 
of knowledge in the social sciences. Media historian Jérôme Bourdon 
likewise points to underemployed strategies of researching reception: 
oral history and media memories, as well as the pre-formatting of 
experiences by digital media and the recent methods of sentiment 
analysis and opinion mining. Frank Bösch asks for more historical 
research into the ways in which media change daily habits and 
strategies of communication16. In short, a true fusion of contemporary 
history with the history of the mass media holds extraordinary 
opportunities – once we overcome the disciplinary disconnect and 
begin to explore approaches beyond the traditional history canon 
taught at undergraduate level.  
In the following pages, while not exhausting the subject fully, I will 
highlight several key approaches, which allow for the writing of media 
history with society, and with nations and transnational exchanges, in 
mind. The approaches I will concentrate on are an actor-centered 
media history (1), an intermedial focus (2), the study of medialization 
(3), and the analysis of «reach, standing, framing, and agenda-
setting», with a particular focus on television (4). Lastly, I will discuss 
the challenges facing transnational media historians: the tension 
between the national and transnational approach, and the pitfalls of 
analyzing the Europeanisation, Americanization, or globalization of 
mass media during the twentieth century (5). 
1. Actor-centered media history 
Following the lead of Jürgen Habermas’ seminal study on the 
«structural transformation of the public sphere», historians from the 
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1960s onwards increasingly identified public debates as activities 
shaped by their spatial location. The spatial concept of the «public 
sphere» (or, in the original, Öffentlichkeit) sees mass communication 
taking place in the space between the private sphere and the state. 
This abstract concept leaves little room for historical actors; it deals 
mainly with structures, institutions, and processes. Whether scholars 
define the public sphere as a market place for arguments (Habermas) 
or as a «medium for society’s self-reference» (Kurt Imhof), they tend 
to focus on discourses detached from identifiable speakers. Debates 
are being analyzed with particular reference to structures of 
communication, levels and layers of different publics, or the 
relationship of media institutions and programs in mind – leading to 
abstract theories in which historical actors are drained of agency, and 
their interests, social practices and ideas need not be investigated17. 
Similarly, the «dispositif» approach – by which media scholars 
describe the complex relations between media receiver, media 
content and media user – leaves little room for institutional and 
individual actors18. But we can only trace the impact of media on 
society and state, and vice versa, if we focus on individual and group 
actors and their decisions. The communication practices of people 
constitute the public sphere and define its borders. Media history is 
always also the social history of those who make the media: journalists, 
publishers, editors, intellectuals, photographers, public relations 
firms, and so on. These people are the gatekeepers of public speaking, 
they shape the language in public debates and they engage in agenda-
setting (defining the hierarchy of topics worthy of public debate, and 
introducing new topics) 19 . They also engage in cross-border 
interaction and networks. 
For the writing of transnational and international media history, the 
concepts of public sphere, discourses, and dispositif will be of little 
help because they are abstractions based on the nation as underlying 
structure. Only an actor-centered approach enables us to leave the 
national setting and focus on the entanglements and the travels of 
ideas, media content, and media personnel across borders. Reporters 
cover foreign news; publishers and editors copy foreign media 
patterns and practices; trainee journalists learn part of their trade 
abroad; broadcasters shop for series formats and feature films on 
international programming fairs; censors battle the influx of foreign 
media content; NGOs and public relation firms address audiences 
beyond national borders; viewers and listeners in border regions seek 
out content from multiple sources beyond the national context. The 
context in which twentieth century mass media operated was inter- 
and transnational to start with, but became even more so as the 
century wore on. 
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A look at the historiography of propaganda in modern dictatorships 
also underscores the need for an actor-centered approach. If we 
underestimate the agency of journalists and audience members, even 
in dictatorial settings, we easily fall into the trap of a top-down, 
totalitarian narrative in which limitless media manipulation leads to 
brainwashing of the masses. But the historiography of the National 
Socialist regime has shown that the limits of state-sponsored 
propaganda, the agency of media personnel, and the obstinacy of 
listeners and readers were greater than initially assumed20. Historians 
also argue that the Soviet Union’s communist media policy lacked 
consistency and often failed, leading to a political culture where 
propaganda and censorship were not as monolithic and powerful as 
they pretended to be21. 
2. The intermedial approach 
While the agency of those who make and receive media matters, 
neither the production nor the reception of media messages happens 
in isolation. Both media scholars and media historians thus stress the 
«intermedial» setting in which mass media operate. Each medium is 
produced and received in competition with others, and occupies a 
place in an internal hierarchy of mass media. Particularly useful in this 
regard is Axel Schildt’s concept of the evolving «mass media 
ensembles» in which certain media enjoy pole position for defined 
time periods. Schildt outlines four stages of the modern mass media 
ensemble since the late nineteenth century. The first era saw the rise 
of the mass press as a leading medium, followed by the era of radio, 
then television, and most recently the internet taking over as leading 
medium22. Certain rules apply when a new medium attains dominance 
and the ensemble reconfigures itself. While the old media stay on, they 
lose their leading role and their content will no longer be mirrored 
and commented on by other media to the same extent. The ensemble 
as a whole will expand and the total time individuals spend on 
combined media use will rise. For instance, tabloids, radio channels, 
and television are still being produced and received in the twenty-first 
century, even though they have lost their former function as prime 
media. The internet, personal computers, and smart phones top the 
media hierarchy instead, and daily mass media usage has increased by 
several hours each day (on average) since the 1930s. The rise of 
television, for instance, led to audiences cutting down on sleep during 
the 1950s and 1960s. Popular television shows of the 1960s and 1970s 
generated much of their social impact in the process of being mirrored 
by other mass media within the ensemble23. The interdependence and 
hierarchy of mass media are a strong argument against historical 
studies, which concentrate on one medium at a time. Different mass 
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media always coexist, impact each other, and only as an ensemble 
impact society and state24. 
3. Medialization 
Historians often approach interactions between media and society, or 
media and state, using the paradigm of the «medialization» process. 
In the same context, mass communication scholars use the term 
«mediatization» 25 . Both «medialization» and «mediatization» 
commonly refer to the steady increase of mass media impact in the 
modern world. The growing power of media requires different social 
sectors, as well as individuals, to adapt their strategies to the 
conditions set by these media: their genres, their time schedules, and 
their modes of access. Exact definitions of the term medialization vary, 
but not widely. Media scholar Sonia Livingstone speaks of «the meta 
process by which everyday practices and social relations are 
historically shaped by mediating technologies and media 
organizations»26. Knut Lundby defines medialization as «the impact 
of media or media communications on social change in contemporary, 
high modern societies»27. In an edited volume concerned with the 
function of media in Twentieth century democracies and 
dictatorships, Frank Bösch and Norbert Frei understand 
medialization as a «process of interdependent stimulation of media 
development and society development», pointing out an «increasing 
saturation of society by media» and an «increase in media-driven self-
reflection of society»28. With an eye on the history of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Bernd Weisbrod explains «political 
medialization» as an active process by which the political sphere is 
made, including the «politicization of communicative conflicts» 
(«Politisierung von Kommunikationskonflikten») and the 
«production of communicative awareness» («Herstellung von 
Kommunikationsbewußtsein»). He sees modern mass media as 
agents, which activate new configurations of communicative contexts 
and drive political actors to claim inclusion in public debates29. 
As these definitions highlight, most studies of the historical 
medialization process concentrate on the political realm. They look at 
the use of media «from above» by exploring subjects such as 
propaganda and election campaigns, polling by political parties, and 
the theatrical staging of state visits or parliamentary proceedings. In a 
long-term process, politicians, parties, advisers, lobbyists, and 
advertisers learned how to access and use the power of new mass 
media30. (It needs to be emphasized, however, that the medialization 
of politics did not in itself cause the rise of symbolic and visualized 
politics, as political scientists Matthias Kepplinger and Thomas Meyer 
suggest. Throughout the middle ages and early modern period, 
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politics were built on the symbolic, ritualized, and visual 
communication of power31). The investigation of media scandals and 
their role in politics is a closely related pursuit32. Several studies also 
approach the issue from the perspective of media actors, in particular 
television journalists33. Most recently, Ute Daniel reconstructed the 
relations between actors in politics and journalism in Britain and 
Germany over the course of the twentieth century. She concludes that 
both sides were interested in, and dependent on, a cartel of mutual 
trust (Vertraulichkeitskartell): Politicians regularly delivered 
confidential news to journalists who could ill afford to criticize their 
informants publicly. This structure rather effectively served to avoid 
prominent clashes between media and politics, while the asymmetrical 
power balance in the end always favored politicians34. The imbalance 
Daniels describes was naturally even more pronounced in the case of 
the dictatorial systems of Communist-controlled Eastern Europe after 
1945. Numerous studies show that the Communist media systems of 
the Cold War were less monolithic than often assumed, often 
depending less on direct censorship and more on the channeling of 
public opinion by selecting and training willing journalists. But 
generally, the mass media behind the Iron Curtain operated under 
much more restrictive conditions than their Western counterparts35. 
While mass media’s effects on the political realm have been studied 
extensively, there is a curious dearth of studies dealing with the impact 
of medialization on the private sphere or the sphere of business and 
administration. The impact of rising mass media on individual 
lifestyles and attitudes, the relations between media and the 
grassroots, have mostly been dealt with by media scholars as part of 
the «uses and gratifications» approach. Beyond these confines, the 
medialization of private lives in modern history remains 
underinvestigated 36 . For instance, how did youth cultures, work 
cultures, or the relationship between patients and doctors change 
when the mass media ensemble reconfigured itself? How did schools, 
administrations, courts, and marketers adapt to new mass media? 
Individuals typically cut down on other activities to make time for use 
of new media. They adapt their daily schedules to catch a favorite 
media message, and change the way they shop or socialize. 
Reconstructing these choices from the bottom up poses challenges for 
historians who cannot rely on sending out questionnaires or observing 
media use in a fieldwork setting. Television historians, for example, 
will often find even the few surviving ratings reports in broadcasters’ 
archives disappointing in content. Still, certain genres of primary 
sources allow for the historical investigation of the medialization of 
private lives. A fruitful approach by Jérôme Bourdon relies on 
collecting «media memories» or «life stories» of media users. He 
argues that television viewers organize the flow of images according 
to their memories. In the interview setting, they remember «major 
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media figures and celebrities (‘media friends’, as J. Meyerowitz put 
it)», but also well-known media events, media crises, and those key 
points where TV became intertwined with their daily schedules and 
life cycles. People may remember the shows they watched at breakfast 
before they went to school, the program choices their parents argued 
over, or the night they were allowed to stay up beyond their usual 
bedtime because of a special event being broadcast37. Elsewhere, I 
have used anthropological sources from a Westphalian folklore 
archive to explore how villagers responded to the arrival of TV during 
the 1950s and 1960s. Once the set arrived in their homes, villagers 
slept less (on average) and were more hesitant to visit their neighbors. 
Pastimes such as playing cards and knitting became less popular, 
living rooms were reorganized, and the livestock began to be fed on a 
different schedule38. Sources on the private responses to mass media 
are more likely to be found outside the archives of broadcasters and 
state organizations: for instance, in private homes, on Ebay, or on the 
basement shelves of contemporary social scientists, anthropologists, 
or NGOs.  
4. Reach, standing, framing, and agenda-setting 
The analytical concepts of «reach», «standing», «framing», and 
«agenda-setting» can be of use when investigating the social impact 
and medialization effects of audio-visual mass media. These concepts 
can be applied not only to television history but also to other modern 
mass media, although I am using TV as an example in what follows.  
To explore a particular media message’s «reach» means to reconstruct 
the social and geographical makeup of audiences, testing in particular 
whether reception stretched to include previously underserved 
groups of viewers, listeners or readers. For instance, 1970s TV 
situational comedies (or ‘sitcoms’) reached social groups that had 
been far from the center of cultural change in the pre-television era: 
housewives, children and teenagers, rural dwellers, the elderly, and 
the poor. I have argued elsewhere that such access to previously 
untapped audiences boosted processes of value change during the 
long sixties. The monitoring of television ratings and audience 
response grew increasingly sophisticated over the 1960s and 1970s 
and provides today’s scholars with illuminating, if methodically not 
always unproblematic, source material39. 
The other three concepts, borrowed from the social sciences, serve to 
examine the ways in which mass media influenced contemporary 
debates about changing values. «Standing» signifies that a media 
message only has an impact because all actors in society believe in its 
impact. To again refer to 1970s popular television comedies: 
Contemporaries assigned considerable standing to such shows by 
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making their heroes and props into long-lasting national symbols, 
museum exhibits, and material for election campaigns and academic 
research. The American sitcom All in the Family and its lead character 
Archie Bunker became national icons, with Archie’s living room chair 
being enshrined in the National Museum of American History40.  
The next concept, «framing», points to the way contemporaries used 
mass media content as a script for their own negotiations of social 
change. «Framing» is a mechanism by which mass media provide 
viewers with narratives and frames into which they can insert their 
own personal experiences and memories of public debates. Media 
scholars define frames as «organizing ideas», «organizing themes», or 
«patterns of presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion»41. 
They function like templates, which media producers use and repeat 
while creating media messages. The concept of «framing» has resulted 
in compelling studies of political discourses in modern newspapers. 
For example, an interdisciplinary project by Myra Marx Ferree, 
William Anthony Gamson, Jürgen Gerhards, and Dieter Rucht 
analysed the North American and German press debate on abortion, 
using statistical coding of thousands of articles in addition to 
interviews with key players. It differentiates between several forums 
of debate (the arena, the gallery, and the backstage) and develops 
useful concepts such as «critical discourse moments», the «discursive 
opportunity structure», and «validator media»42. 
«Validator media» for Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, and Rucht are mass 
media with particularly high standing both within the fields of 
journalism, politics and elsewhere – what historians might call the 
leading media of the mass media ensemble. During the 1970s, 
television played this role, by now reaching all regions and classes, 
while the technical problems of the beginning had been overcome. 
Viewers could only choose between very few channels, sending part 
of the day only, but almost everyone had a TV. This was the «era of 
limited choice», during which the scarcity of programming on offer 
amplified the medium’s impact. During prime hours, a select few 
channels aired programs for wide audiences and aimed at «family 
viewing» (as opposed to later decades when careful targeting of 
specific demographic groups with different formats became the norm 
in broadcasting). Therefore, everyday sociability was underpinned by 
the common experience of large swathes of the population having 
watched the same broadcast the evening before. It is difficult to 
underestimate the standing of prime-time television shows during the 
era of limited choice. In most European countries, this period lasted 
from the 1960s to the early 1980s, by which time privatization and 
channel proliferation took hold43. 
During the era of limited choice, certain blockbusters – massively 
popular TV series, cinema films, or pop music hits – delivered almost 
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universally known, endlessly returning, and structurally easy to 
understand stories that became «framing scripts» through which 
viewers could make sense of their world and construct their own 
multiple and fluid identities. In a process of continual negotiation, 
individuals struggle to give meaning to their lives, to relate them to 
larger units (such as nations or social groups). They do so in multiple 
ways, constructing parallel identities as, for example, citizens, 
workers, or women. As we negotiate and communicate our identities 
through language, we make use of the formal structures of stories: 
temporal and spatial order, a grammar-clarifying agency, a beginning 
and an ending, a climax and possibly unexpected twists. Often, our 
storytelling relies on familiar heroes and a limited number of tropes 
or frames44. Media blockbusters offered a vocabulary, an imagery, and 
characters to weave into personal stories: heroes and villains such as 
Archie Bunker the bigot, fun patterns such as a TV character’s hairdo, 
accent, or malapropisms. Recurring catchphrases taken from TV, 
film, or music worked their way into ordinary people’s narratives, as 
did costumes, hairstyles, or theme tunes. Referring to frames from 
popular mass media served to negotiate values in a way that was fun 
and removed from personal (possibly painful or embarrassing) 
experiences. It allowed viewers to communicate personal identities to 
others who also, very presumably, had received the same media 
messages. And as mass media engaged in the selection of frames, they 
also set limits to people’s storytelling. Mass media’s «framing scripts» 
can exclude, dominate, and suppress minority identities and 
alternative stories. 
Lastly, to explore «agenda-setting» means asking whether mass media 
raise awareness of particular issues by introducing new topics or 
reintroducing old topics to public and political debate. «Agenda-
setting» refers to the selection of topics for mass media coverage, and 
this includes the topics’ placement, repetition, and the internal 
structure with which they are presented45. Media scholars posit that 
agenda-setting does not tell people what to think, but what to think 
about. The less political knowledge and education recipients can draw 
on, the more likely they are to «accept the priorities suggested by the 
media»46. 
5. Transnational media history and nation-building mass media 
To a certain extent, modern mass media always serve a transnational 
function because they transmit news and entertainment within and 
beyond borders. If we define «transnational» exchanges as goods, 
people, or ideas travelling from one country to another, radio and 
television waves – permeating state borders – qualify as transnational 
in nature, just like many printed media, which are read beyond the 
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confines of one nation. Radio and television audiences naturally 
transcend political borders, a fact much exploited during the Cold 
War when East Germans in the German Democratic Republic were 
targeted by West German broadcasts and vice versa, or Radio Liberty 
catered to audiences in Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe. Moreover, 
as the twentieth century progressed, these media increasingly 
depended on an international market for formats and finished 
content. The considerable expense involved in producing programs 
led to a lively trade of series and formats from the 1950s onwards, 
even across the iron curtain. International programming fairs 
developed, and large broadcasters or production centers such as the 
BBC and Hollywood began to sell their output to clients worldwide. 
European TV channels also collaborated from the beginning, with the 
Eurovision song contest being a case in point. The worldwide 
exchange of broadcasting personnel and techniques developed in a 
similar vein. 
In spite of the undeniably transnational nature of audio-visual mass 
media, scholars traditionally focused almost exclusively on the 
national aspects of their history. They concentrated on national 
frameworks because modern mass media developed together with the 
nation state, and were employed as its tools from the beginning47. 
Even in the context of international research cooperations, projects 
were typically investigated within single-nation settings, often 
resulting in edited volumes with «nation-by-chapter reporting» 
without a real synthesis or comparison48 . Since the 1990s, Anglo-
American scholars (whose cultural studies approach for a long time 
dominated the field of television studies) strongly emphasized 
television’s nation-building function. They saw electronic and audio-
visual media as powerful instruments of nation-building, building on 
Benedict Anderson who understood media as key players in the 
collective construction of «imagined communities»49. Radio and then 
TV emerged as the storyteller of national myths and keeper of the 
national calendar. Broadcasting served the processes of national 
integration and mobilization, telling national stories and binding 
regions together with a new, common language. In this way, radio and 
TV served both democratic and dictatorial modern states, as 
exemplified by Roosevelt’s fireside chats or Führer speeches 
broadcast on Volksempfänger sets. Media scholars stressed that 
television embodied «the modernist intent of engineering a national 
identity» like no other medium (Jean K. Chalaby) and fulfilled from 
the 1950s onwards a «key role as a stabilizing factor of the national 
experience»50. 
Countering this trend, researchers more recently began to explore 
transnational contexts. One of the first forces fueling the transnational 
turn in media history was the desire, and existence of funding 
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opportunities, for a Europeanization of research. Several projects 
embarked on the search for an «European identity» fostered by mass 
media. Studies emerged that explored the Europe-wide trade in 
programming or cross-border negotiations about technical 
broadcasting standards. Therefore, we now have a history of the 
Eurovision network, of the European Song contest, of the European 
Broadcasting Union, and of the controversy about the technical 
standardization of color broadcasting51. Since 2004, the European 
Television History Network held several conferences and put a large 
amount of source material online52. At the end, though, researchers 
concluded that there was and is no such thing as a European media 
landscape or media-induced European identity. A recent edited 
volume summarized: «What has become evident is the dominance of 
‘national’ political and cultural context that informs the signifying 
practices of television in Europe»53. 
Similar caution has been expressed by scholars who investigated the 
supposed «Americanization» or «Globalization» process of national 
cultures via imported media content during the second half of the 
twentieth century. Contrary to popular perception, there was no huge, 
unchecked one-way Americanization process to which European 
mass media succumbed after 1945. Most television genres, for 
example, such as news, children’s programming, documentaries, 
drama and comedy series, remained dominated by nationally 
produced broadcasts until the late twentieth century. While American 
models were undeniably influential, European broadcasters did not 
simply import and copy U.S. productions. Rather, «mutual inspiration 
and co-operation», globalization processes, and European political 
decisions resulted in hybrid and popularized forms of broadcasting 
on the continent. To cite the media historian Ib Bondebjerg:  
«American series taught the Europeans many a lesson on how to reach an audience 
… In the history of European television it has sometimes been too easy to blame the 
Americans. Many of the developments in European television have not been caused 
by American dominance, but by internal struggles between popular culture and high 
culture within the nation-states of Europe»54. 
Since 2010, the transnational turn in the humanities reached the 
discipline of media history with full force. That year, the journal 
«Media History» presented a special issue on transnational television 
history with contributions on the transnational careers of individual 
producers and correspondents, and the import and export of several 
programming formats55. «Glocal» media scholarship now began to 
embrace the study of globally traded TV formats and the way they are 
translated and received by local producers and audiences. Such work 
typically concentrates on post-2000 programming, privileges 
production over reception contexts, and only rarely engages with 
historical examples56. While the patterns and flows of the more recent 
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programming trade and the localization of travelling television texts 
receive much attention, pre-1980 programming and audience 
responses are all but ignored57. 
These new studies raise important questions about modern mass 
media’s transnational links and cross-border effects while often 
reinforcing that the local or national framework largely trumped the 
transnational. Whenever a format is imported, it will quickly be 
nationalized or localized, as I have argued elsewhere in regard to the 
export of the British sitcom format Till Death Us Do Part. This series’ 
West German and American versions in the 1970s comprehensively 
adapted characters, plots, and storylines to national specificities and 
purged the original format of all foreign references. The producers in 
the three involved countries even used the series to engage in the 
stereotyping of the national other, poking fun at foreigners and the 
international variants of their own programs. Audiences in West 
Germany and the United States saw the format as a typical expression 
of their own national identity, ignoring that it had been imported from 
Britain. Paradoxically, the imported television heroes became 
national idols, their foreign ancestry quickly forgotten – a reminder 
that all national identities are complex puzzles, cobbled together from 
foreign as well as domestic sources58. Therefore, the transnational 
context in which mass media messages are produced can end up 
fueling the nationalizing function of the medium at large. 
One of the most influential voices in the debate on global and local 
media impact has been Arjun Appadurai. In his book Modernity at 
Large, he describes the world we live in as one globalized by the 
media. Audiences now split into «deterritorialized» groups, 
transcending national borders. Koreans in American exile may be 
watching Korean channels on the internet, or Turkish migrants in 
Germany may be following their favorite Turkish sitcom via recorded 
video cassettes or on satellite TV. As these migrant groups form 
«diasporic public spheres» abroad, the mass media contribute to the 
decline of nation states in a globalizing world. Audiences as well as 
media become more transnational in nature59. Appadurai’s concepts 
of deterritorialized audiences and diasporic public spheres 
invigorated global and transnational approaches to media history.  
Nevertheless, the staying power of nationalism, and of those 
Twentieth century leading media that became powerful instruments 
of nation-building – TV, radio, and penny papers – should not be 
underestimated. The intriguing vision of a transnational media world 
with deterritorialized audiences is specific to the twenty-first century 
or at the most to the period from the late 1990s onwards. Only when 
the internet became the new leading medium, the mass media 
ensemble reconfigured itself and television was partially dethroned. 
But even today, in 2018, the nationalizing power of audio-visual media 
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has not waned completely. In highly developed countries, huge sums 
are still being spent on television advertising for election campaigns 
and product launches. Public health and pacification drives in less 
developed countries still use radio and television as the instruments 
of choice. NGO projects have long harnessed audio-visual mass media 
power to bring about social change around the globe, typically for 
purposes of conflict resolution and prevention60. Light entertainment 
real-life drama and soap series, locally produced and weaving in 
current issues in a limited number of subplots, have been shown to be 
most effective at changing behavior. Several recent surveys document 
the success of broadcast interventions in spreading awareness of 
HIV/AIDS, lowering fertility rates and tackling domestic violence in 
Ethiopia, Tanzania, and South Africa61. To this day, television stars 
such as Donald Trump and owners of TV stations such as Silvio 
Berlusconi have built successful political careers on broadcasting. 
They use particular television channels to play to their base and 
bolster their popular support on a daily basis. The Brexit campaign in 
Britain, with its nationalist agenda, also relied to a large extent on 
tabloids62. The era of the traditional nation-building mass media is not 
over yet, even if the internet may already play a deterritorializing role 
for some pockets of society. 
Looking at the twentieth century from today, we can see the power of 
the nation state and the nation-building function of mass media more 
clearly than ever. Therefore, historical studies of transnational media 
links and exchanges should not simply be seen as an antithesis to the 
study of media history in nationalized settings. Rather, transnational 
approaches can enrich our understanding of mass media’s 
nationalizing role in modern history by keeping questions of national 
development and nation-building in mind. Historians can fruitfully 
design research projects, which do not replicate the national map but, 
in their approach, still take the nation into account. Projects on the 
mass media in modern history can focus not only on national entities, 
but also on villages, towns, cities, regions, borderlands, empires, and 
colonies. They can investigate multi-national or multi-regional 
comparisons, center-periphery exchanges and cross-border travels, or 
audiences beyond borders without having to disprove the mass 
media’s key role in constructing national identities. For instance, how 
did readers, viewers, and listeners receive and use media messages in 
borderland regions? To what extent were foreign broadcasts able to 
disrupt or destroy the cocoon of a nationalized mass media ensemble? 
Which hybrid forms of media programming or reception patterns 
developed in borderlands or among migrant audiences? To what 
extent were local or regional mass media discourses able to resist the 
impact of nationalizing mass media? There are many ways to engage 
meaningfully with questions of national identity building and national 
agenda setting in non-national research settings. 
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